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REFLECTIONS ON MARKET 
REFORM IN POST-WAR, POST-
EMBARGO VIETNAM 
LANCAo• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam's long war ended on April 30, 1975, more than twenty-
five years ago. I was one of the lucky ones who was able to leave, and 
along with hundreds of thousands of others, made my new life in the 
United States, all the while with my eyes glued to the events in 
Vietnam. In Midnight's Children, Salman Rushdie told the story of a 
boy, Saleem, born on the stroke of midnight on the day India declared 
independence from the British. 1 By virtue of that coincidence, Saleem 
was bestowed-along with 1,001 other children born in the first hour 
of India's Independence, between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on August 
14, 1947-with telepathic powers.2 Midnight's Children is about the 
interweaving of myth, magic, and history in the little boy's life, a 
mythical refiguration, a surrealistic mirror in ·other words, of India 
itself, with all the cracks, fissures, dashed hopes, and unrealized 
* Lan Cao is Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law. Professor Cao graduated magna cum laude, phi beta kappa 
from Mount Holyoke College and Yale law School, where she was an Editor of the 
Yale Law Journal. Professor Cao has published widely on a range of topics, such as 
privatization in transitional economies, globalization, U.S. trade laws, law and 
economics, and economic development. Her recent publications include Chinese 
Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 L. & Contemporary Problems 13 (2000) 
and Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 841 (1999). In 
1996, upon invitation from the Ministry of Education, Professor Cao delivered a series 
oflectures on international business law at the University of Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi. 
1. Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1989). 
2. !d. 
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aspirations that accompanied post-independence construction. 3 As 
Saleem remarked self-importantly, "Thanks to the occult tyrannies of 
those blandly saluting clocks I had been mysteriously handcuffed to 
history, my destinies indissolubly chained to those of my country."4 
To a certain degree, though on a much less hallucinatory or 
fantastic scale, the personal lives of many Vietnamese overseas in 
America remain tied, in one way or another, to the collective history of 
the country we left behind. Whether we like or dislike the new regime, 
even if we have severed ourselves from the government, the umbilical 
cord connecting us to the country remains strong. And so, it was with 
great emotional and political interest that we watched as Vietnam 
embarked first on a policy that walled the country off from the global 
economy, and then in recent years, a policy that has shifted the 
country's course away from separation, toward international 
integration. 
The so-called "new"5 law and development movement, with its 
emphasis on market economics,6 is currently experiencing a 
resurgence, as interest in development shifts from one that relies on a 
declaration of a "right to development," and other rights under United 
Nations' auspices, to one that relies on market-based reforms.7 This 
essay briefly chronicles Vietnam's postwar years, its policy of isolation 
instituted after April 30, 1975, and its subsequent shift toward 
incremental reintegration with the global economy. After five years of 
negotiations, Vietnam has entered into a comprehensive bilateral trade 
accord with the United States, another step toward greater integration. 
With its new emwhasis on more openness, more communication, and 
more connection, what else must Vietnam do to ensure that openness 
3. Jd. 
4. Id. at 11. 
5. "New," presumably, to distinguish itself from the out-of-style sociology-
dominated law and development movement of the 1960s. 
6. See generally Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 
16 Inti. Rev. L. & Econ. 141, 142 (June 1996). 
7. See e.g. Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic 
Development, 32 Tex. Inti. L.J. 209, 266 (1997) (discussing efforts to move the 
economic development debate from the market norms of the GATT/WTO to the norms 
of the UN, through the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights; the declarations to a new international economic order; and a "right to 
development" in order "to create a more sweeping affirmative ethos deemed more 
conducive to the economic needs of the developing world"). 
8. Investors Cautiously Applaud Vietnam Phone Rate Slash, Deutsche Presse-
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becomes a reality and to facilitate its transition from a closed; centrally 
planned economy to a more diverse market-based one? More 
specifically, which policies, given the structural and political 
constraints posed by Communist Party (Party) rule, will best facilitate 
its efforts at legal reforms to further its objective of economic 
integration and its self-professed commitment to the "rule of law"?9 
This essay will situate these questions within the specific context of 
Vietnam's historical experiences with the Chinese, French, and Soviet 
legal systems. 
I have, however," no grand conclusions to offer, partly because the 
observations in this essay are somewhat impressionistic, drawn from 
my personal experience and intuition, and partly because Vietnam itself 
has no comprehensive or grand conclusion either. One often hears that 
Vietnam and other countries such as China, and a few Eastern 
European countries, are not only "developing" but also "transitional"-
that is, countries still no.t fully formed, not "quite there" yet, but on 
their way toward a place already predestined, probably very much like 
the place arrived at by Western industrialized countries. But as the 
writer Jorge Luis Borges remarked, "time forks, perpetually, into 
countless futures." 10 
My observations are limited to which future, among the 
innumerable ones facing postwar, post-embargo Vietnam, that Vietnam 
must not embrace. That it must abandon a command and control 
economy is clear, with its built-in ideological notion that the 
government is empowered to preempt all allocations except those 
planned, ordered, and administered by it. A system in which the 
government decides who is to enter into what kind of exchanges with 
whom, and in which quantities and for what purpose, does not have 
much to say in terms of allowing, much less furthering, individual 
rights and freedom. 
Agentur (Sept. 22, 2000). As the deputy administration manager of the Directorate 
General of Posts and Telecommunications announced this year, "We want to facilitate 
Vietnam's process of integration into the global community and we want foreign 
investors to understand they are welcome in Vietnam." Id. 
9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 ( 1997) (discussing the varying interpretations of the 
"rule of law."). "The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historic ideal, the precise 
meaning of which may be less clear today than ever before." Id. 
10. Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths, in Collected Fictions: Jorge 
Luis Borges 127 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking Press 1998). 
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Vietnam is currently engaged in legal reform, or as the process 
has been popularly termed, the construction of a "rule of law." This is 
a term with problematic overtones. One could object that what the 
Western law-and-development advisers aim to introduce in a rule-of-
law project is a cultural export that seeks to impose Western standards 
and understanding onto other societies. But an even more basic, first-
order objection should be noted. The term "rule of law," and not just 
its content, whatever that may be, is value-laden. It assumes that 
certain societies that do not have the characteristics of a "rule of law" 
are characterized by anarchy and lawlessness, disorder and chaos, and 
must therefore be "remade," their culture re-invented from the outside 
in, from the top down. For example, is a society whose members are 
guided by, and comply with, traditional norms of behavior, 11 a society 
that is devoid of law? Should community reliance on traditional 
dispute resolution, such as informal mediation that emphasizes 
conciliation under the guidance of a community elder (usually male) be 
replaced by more institutionalized mechanisms consisting of courts and 
lawyers engaged in formal litigation? Are norms that exist outside the 
state-supported edifice of codes and rules less "law-like" than formal 
law? Indeed, scholars of the United States in recent years have studied 
the operation of informal community norms in a variety of settings and 
have suggested that such norms act not only as a guide for behavior, 
but also provide their own sets of enforcement and sanctions against 
breach. It is thus paradoxical that the law and development "rule of 
law" projects pay so little attention to the norms or private law of 
countries at issue, or more specifically, to the interaction between 
private law and state law in such countries-even while their 
counterparts in other fields of law are devoting time and intellectual 
energy to this very concept. 
This criticism, however, is not intended to be an argument against 
legal reform as such, but merely against legal reform undertaken with 
the presumption that whatever system certain countries have, that 
regime does not qualify as law. It might very well be that pre-reform 
sets of rules, norms, standards, even formal laws, are not conducive to 
the establishment of a certain type of society or a certain mode of 
II. That is, "informal" community or "private law"-rather than by the rules of 
"formal," state law enacted by the legislature. See generally Lan Cao, Looking at 
Communities and Markets, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 841 (1999). 
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economic system. This does not necessarily mean, however, that such 
a pre-reform regime is a Hobbesian one without a "rule oflaw." 
The Vietnamese government, for example, has embarked on a 
path of "market socialism"-a market-based economy within the 
perimeters of government-controlled socialism. In this respect, it is 
appropriate and necessary to ask what type of law is required to support 
a market economy generally, and a market economy in a globalized 
system particularly. Does the current regime of laws, formal or 
informal, promote market exchanges? The government has proclaimed 
that it is putting into place a "rule of law." However, it seems that the 
Vietnamese government currently confuses the enactment of laws with 
the establishment of a "rule of law." "Rule of law," at least in the 
context of a modem, open-market system of economic exchanges, is 
something altogether different from "rule by law"-that is, the 
institution of multiple laws, decrees, and circulars that together add up 
to legislation overload, increased bureaucratization, and the very 
opposite of transparency, impartiality, and predictability-the basic 
principles necessary for a "rule of law" in a market economy. "Rule by 
law," in other words, means the state continues to rule by the use of 
"law" rather than by party fiat. "Rule of law," by contrast, implies a 
situation where the government's rule is itself constrained by the limits 
of law. A market economy, especially one that seeks integration with 
the global economic system, needs to ensure that its economic laws are 
transparent, impartial, and predictable. The obvious conclusion then, is 
this: The "rule of law" project for a country that seeks to establish a 
market economy is one that will put in place the values of 
transparency, impartiality, and predictability. 
II. "DAY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" AND YEARS OF POSTWAR 
ISOLATION: ANTI-MARKET, ANTI-CAPITAL, ANTI-INTEGRATION 
In the Little Saigons scattered across the United States, April 30 
is remembered as the Day ofNational Mourning. In Vietnam, April30 
is officially designated the Day of National Liberation. 
For years since the war's end, Vietnam, under the control of the 
Party, has adopted a policy of national liberation-"liberation" of the 
market from individual bourgeois preferences and "liberation" of the 
national economy from the international economic system. Vietnam 
adopted economic policies that were aimed. at ensuring Party control of 
the domestic market, while severing the domestic market from the 
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international market. When North Vietnam declared independence 
from the French in 1945, it adopted a central plan to ensure Party 
control of the market for the pursuit of economic policies that the Party 
favored. To the extent that a free market of voluntary exchanges 
reflects individual preferences, the Party took steps essentially to 
strangle the market and force it to reflect Party-imposed plans and 
preferences12 in accordance with the Marxist view that markets are 
neither fixed nor natural, but contingent on, and a reflection of, social 
and hegemonic constructs. Hegemony-originally a Greek term used 
to designate the power of a state over other states, Athens over the 
other Greek states for example, or as it later came to be understood, the 
power of Prussia over the German states 13-was later extended to 
include a system of domination that relies not on brute force, but on 
control by more subtle or seemingly consensual means. 14 Building on 
12. Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold 
War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & Socy. Rev. 93, 98 (1998). According to a 
Vietnamese scholar, the Party's rule by decree ensured that individual preferences, 
whether as reflected in the economic sphere, or some other sphere, would be 
subordinated to the State's preferences. 
Everything was prearranged by the State, while personal interests had to 
entirely submit to the interests of the State and the collective. Thus, there 
was only one option left for social relations: to obey the administrative orders 
issued from above and at all levels. In such a situation even a semblance of 
legality became superfluous or just a formality. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
13. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 105 (2d ed. 1989). Besides Gramsci's 
reformulation of the term "hegemony," it is also used in international relations to 
suggest the condition of control by one state over another, through force, culture, and 
economics. See generally William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, 
US Intervention, and Hegemony 21 (Cambridge U. Press 1996). 
14. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971) [hereinafter Prison 
Notebooks]. Gramsci explained the concept of hegemony as a condition in which the 
supremacy of a social group is maintained not by physical force or command, but by 
the submission of the very group dominated. Control must be maintained with "force 
and ... consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation." Jd. at 180. The 
first type of control may be achieved through state action, the police, the army, and the 
courts. The second, more insidious, type may be achieved through the co-opting of 
dissent, the dissemination and perpetuation of the dominant beliefs as universal and 
natural and neutral-internalized and accepted by a range of institutions such as 
schools, churches, museums, and culture. Domination therefore is often achieved not 
through constant force, but through subtle and often consensual means. I d. 
2001] REFLECTIONS ON MARKET REFORM IN VIETNAM 1035 
Marx's idea of a base and superstructure, 15 in which Marx espoused a 
deterministic causality from the base, defined as the relations of 
economic production, to the superstructure, consisting of law, morality, 
and ideology, Marxists, such as Gramsci, introduced the idea of the 
"historical bloc"-consisting of "structures and superstructures."16 
Thus, "[s]tructures and superstructures form a 'historical bloc.' That is 
to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the 
superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations 
of production."17 The idea of a historical bloc, which draws in other 
institutions neglected by Marx, such as art, education, and religion, but 
which also captures the degree to which the dominant order is reflected 
in and reproduces itself at multiple levels, does not mean that the 
economic sphere-the market-is not central. "For though hegemony 
is ethical-political, it must also be economic."18 If the market is a 
reflection of politics, then it should be politically controlled. 19 The 
15. Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in 
The Marx-Engels Reader 3 (Robert C. Tuckered., 2d ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1978). 
16. Prison Notebooks, supra n. 14, at 377. 
17. Jd. at 366; see Giuseppe Fiori, Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary 238 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1971) 
I d. 
Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay ... in his argument that the system's 
real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive 
power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a 
conception of the world which belongs to the rulers. The philosophy of the 
ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to 
emerge as common sense: that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept 
the morality, the customs, the institutionalized rules of behavior of the 
society they live in. 
18. Prison Notebooks, supra n. 14, at 161. 
19. The Marxist critique of the market is based to a large degree on the notion that 
the market is by no means free nor reflective of individual preference, but rather a 
reflection of a hegemonic social order and vice versa. However, by no means is the 
critique of the market as a social construct solely a Marxist critique-communitarians 
and others have also questioned the claim of market advocates that the market is non-
judgmental because it merely reflects individual preferences. See e.g. Mark Sagoff, 
Should Preferences Count?, 70 Land Econ. 127 (1994) ("Markets create desires ... as 
quickly as they satisfy them; that is why there are salespeople. Markets, then, may be 
inefficient in the sense that the preferences they satisfy tend to be endogenous to 
them."). "As Sagoff suggest[ed], it cannot be argued that the satisfaction of 
preferences is a good thing in itself, for many preferences are sadistic, envious, racist, 
or unjust." Jane B. Baron & Jefferey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral 
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state therefore, in its construction of a socialistic society, should not 
favor individual or market-based preferences, but should seek 
affirmatively to inculcate socialist virtues, even if it means acting to 
circumvent the market or individual preferences as reflected in market 
transactions. 
Like other countries that had liberated themselves from colonial 
domination, such as India under Gandhi and Nehru, Tanzania under 
Nyerere, or Egypt under Nasser, North Vietnam exhibited a profound 
distrust of market and market norms, and generally equated the market 
with foreign domination, colonialism, and imperialism, so that national 
liberation and anti-colonialism meant the imposition of anti-market, 
anti-capital economic policies in the name of nationalism. European 
capital accumulation, as Marx noted, was accomplished during the 
colonial times when "the treasures captured outside Europe by 
undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the 
mother-country and transformed themselves into capital."20 Given this 
history, for the developing world, foreign investment by capitalists 
from the developed world was viewed as a form of neocolonialism 
because it subjects the national economy to foreign control by, and 
dependency on, foreign capitalists in the developed world. 
The dependency theory of development has generally meant the 
adoption of policies designed to extricate the national economy from 
the international economy,21 and to put an end to dependent 
development, that is Third World development dictated by the needs of 
the rich First World. As a result, economic development meant state 
control and administration of the national economy in a way that would 
reflect the preferences and developmental objectives of the state, and 
concomitantly, withdrawal of the national economy from the 
international. Trade barriers were instituted to keep out foreign goods 
and foreign capital and subsidies were bestowed on domestic industry. 
To accomplish this objective, Vietnam, through the Party, promptly 
brought the means of production under unitary state control after its 
declaration of independence. Lands belonging to "reactionary" 
Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 431, 439 (1996) 
(citing Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 Ethics 30 I, 302 (1986)). 
20. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 823, 826 (Frederick 
Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Modem Lib. 1936). 
21. See generally Richard Grabowski & Michael P. Shields, Development 
Economics I 0 (Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1996). 
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landlords and the French were nationalized,22 and agriculture and 
industry were placed under state and collective ownership,23 most 
through administrative decree.24 Similarly, pursuant to its policy 
favoring delinkage from the international economic system and 
economic self-reliance, the Party, following the victory of North 
Vietnam in 1975, extended the central plan already in place in the 
North over the entire country and collectivized agriculture in the 
former South Vietnam. 
Economic production in Vietnam stagnated in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s.25 The post-war economy suffered from hyperinflation, as 
annual rates exceeded 100 percent and reached 400 percent in 1985 and 
1986.26 Vietnam's standard of living declined precipitously, dropping 
to among the lowest in the world, with a gross national product per 
capita of$200.27 An aunt who remained in Saigon, and whom I visited 
in 1996, told me about a morning in early 1975 when she walked 
downstairs to find a couple of young North Vietnamese men in her 
ki~chen, trying to make sense of the kitchen appliances. To her 
astonishment, they were trying to make coffee and had apparently 
mistaken her bra for a coffee filter. These were the same men who 
would be assigned to run her business, a small factory manufacturing 
"tiger balm" ointments that the government promptly confiscated. The 
22. See John Gillespie, Land Law Subsystems? Urban Vietnam as a Case Study, 7 
P. Rim L. & Policy J. 555, 566-67 (1998). "The Land Reform Law of 1953 ... [and 
subsequent implementing decrees] ... divided the ... population along class-lines into 
landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and the 
urban proletariat." /d. 
23. John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative 
Analysis, 30 Stanford J. Inti. L. 325, 331 (1994). 
24. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 97 n. 10. Of the 1,747 legal documents passed 
between 1945 and 1954 in the North, only one was a formal law-the 1953 Land 
Reform Law. /d. The rest consisted of 621 presidential orders, 656 government 
decrees, and 413 ministry circulars. /d. In 1961, the Ministry of Justice was 
dismantled, and the Party, which ruled by decree, not legislation, controlled the 
executive bodies of the government. /d. at 97. 
25. See generally Adam Fforde & Suzanne H. Paine, The Limits of National 
Liberation: Problems of Economic Management in the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (Croom Helm 1987); Dang T. Tran, Vietnam: Socialist Economic 
Development, 1955-1992 (ICS Press 1994). 
26. See Inst. S.E. Asian Stud., Vietnam's Dilemmas and Options: The Challenge of 
Economic Transition in the 1990s 4-5 (Mya Than & Joseph L.H. Tan eds., Inst. S.E. 
Asian Stud. 1993). 
27. 1d. at 31. 
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two had been buffalo herders before being assigned the job of factory 
manager. 
In response to Vietnam's human ri~hts abuses,28 and the apparent 
lack of progress in the POW /MIA issue, 9 the United States reinforced 
Vietnam's segregation from the rest of the world by imposing an 
economic embargo on Vietnam throughout the 1970s and 1980s.30 
Economic contact with Vietnam was prohibited, including such 
commercial activities as ex~ort to Vietnam of all but the most basic 
humanitarian commodities, 1 import of all Vietnamese commodities 
into the United States,32 the movement of U.S. ships and planes to 
Vietnam,33 and the transportation of goods to Vietnam in U.S. planes 
and ships. 34 
In 1986, Vietnam dramatically shifted course. Faced with 
economic decline and dwindling Soviet support, the Sixth Communist 
Party Congress announced that Vietnam, like China almost a decade 
earlier, would transform its centralized command and control economy 
into a market-based system open to foreign investment.35 This pivotal 
shift, called doi moi, meaning "new day" or "renovation," was 
undertaken, among other purposes, to dismantle the collective farming 
28. See generally Brad Parker, Vietnam and Perspectives on Development 
Assistance and Human Rights <http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/fanta07/myhomepage/ 
artgallery.html> (accessed Apr. 4, 2001). 
29. See generally Sen. Exec. Rpt. 103-1 (Jan. 26, 1993) (reprinted in 139 Cong. 
Rec. 8688-06 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993)) (available in 1993 WL 14760) (POW/MIA 
Affairs); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, amend. nos. 1847, 
1848 (reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. 87587-88 (1994)) (available in 1994 WL 279514). 
30. See generally Frederick Z. Brown, President Clinton's Visit to Vietnam 
<http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/clintoninvietnam.html> (accessed Apr. 2, 
2001). In 1977, the Carter administration made overtures to normalize relations with 
Vietnam, whereby the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam, lift the 
embargo, and support international financial loans to Vietnam, as well as grant 
Vietnam most favored nation status. /d. Vietnam, however, demanded that the U.S. 
honor President Nixon's promise, under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, of$3.25 billion 
in economic assistance before it would accept the U.S. offer of normalization. /d. The 
U.S. responded with the claim that Hanoi's violations of the Paris Peace Accords 
nullified any obligation of economic assistance. !d. 
31. 15 C.F.R~ § 785.1 (1994) (amended at 59 Fed. Reg. 6524-25 (Feb. 10, 1994)). 
32. 31 C.P.R.§ 500.204 (1994). 
33. 44 C.P.R.§ 403.1 (1993) (revised at 59 Fed. Reg. 8412-01 (Feb. 22, 1994)). 
34. /d. at § 403.2. 
35. Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325 n. 1. The official policy was announced at the 8th 
Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam, June 10-17, 1986. !d. 
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system, introduce a private sector, and encourage direct foreign 
investment.36 Pursuant to the initial 1986 doi moi policy, the state 
retained its dominant role as economic planner while also taking steps 
to deregulate prices. Subsequently, the Party limited state ownership to 
key industries but liberalized the rest of the economy by allowing 
mixed state and private ownership, including foreign ownership.37 Doi 
moi marked the beginning of the country's transformation-from a 
command economy under absolute Party control, insulated from the 
global economy, to a mixed market, on the way to re-integrating with 
the global economy. 
On February 3, 1994, President Clinton lifted the U.S. economic 
embargo on Vietnam,38 marking the beginning of a series of steps 
taken to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam. 
Since 1994, the United States has established an ambassadorial level 
diplomatic relationship with Vietnam, allowed the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation and the U.S. Export Import Bank to support 
U.S. exports to or operations in Vietnam, and granted a waiver from 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment.39 Pending congressional approval is 
the comprehensive bilateral trade accord between the United States and 
Vietnam,40 which is yet an additional step in Vietnam's efforts in 
recent years to liberalize the market, reverse its inward-looking policy 
in favor of a more outward-looking one that favors integration into the 
36. See generally Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam with Amendments and 
Additions, 30 I.L.M. 930 (1991) [hereinafter Law on Foreign Investment]. On 
December 29, 1987, the Eighth National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam at its second session passed the Law on Foreign Investment. Id. at ch. VI, art. 
42. See Vietnam Trade Network, Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam 
<http://www.vitranet.com.vn/fdi/luat/htmUanh/1002_169.htm> (accessed Apr. 13, 
2001). 
37. See Id. at ch. I, art. I; Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325 n. I; Vern Weitzel, Canst. of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 26 <http://coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/van_kien/ 
constit.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 2001). 
38. See generally Douglas Jehl, Clinton Drops I9-Year Ban on U.S. Trade with 
Vietnam; Cites Hanoi's Help on M.f.A.'s, N.Y. Times AI (Feb. 4, 1994). 
39. H.R. Asia & P. Subcomm., Inti. Econ. Policy & Trade Subcomm. of the Inti. 
Rei. Comm., U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations, 106th Cong. ~ 3 (Sept. 19, 2000) 
(statement of Representative Doug Bereuter, Co-Chair). 
40. See Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Agreement Between the United States of America and 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations ch. 6, arts. 1-8 
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/text.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter Agreement]. 
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global economy, and export promotion as the key to economic 
development. 41 
III. ECONOMIC REFORM, ECONOMIC LEGISLATION, AND THE BRIDGE 
BACK TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: "CAPITAL, CAPITAL, AND 
MORE CAPITAL" 
As Mr. Do Muoi, Vietnam's then-Party Secretary, declared in 
1996, the Party's new "slogan must be capital, capital, and more 
capital."42 Given the transnational mobility of goods, capital, and 
technology, economics is now essentially international. The preamble 
to the bilateral U.S.-Vietnam trade accord states that Vietnam "is 
taking steps to integrate into the regional and world economy by ... 
joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) .... "43 Vietnam is currently presiding for 
the first time over ASEAN, an irony President Clinton noted during an 
economic summit meeting in Brunei, as Vietnam "is heading an 
organization that was invented to contain it."44 
Like China's path of reform, the Vietnamese path is defined by 
the retention of the state's dominant role in the state sector and the 
creation of a parallel non-state sector consisting of private and foreign-
invested enterprises.45 In 1986, the Sixth Communist Party Congress, 
launching doi moi, issued an order to modify the command economy 
by permitting the institution of private and foreign-invested sectors.46 
In 1991, the Seventh Communist Party Congress extended doi moi to 
legal reform. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet announced that, "there must 
be a complete change from bureaucratic management to running the 
41. See Brown, supra n. 30. 
42. Jeremy Grant, Vietnam Party Chief Urges Debt Repayment, Fin. Times 
(London) 3 (Jan. 15, 1996). 
43. See Agreement, supra n. 40. 
44. David E. Sanger, Clinton In Hanoi, Intent on Forging New Relationship, N.Y. 
Times AI (Nov. 17, 2000) (quoting President Clinton). 
45. See generally Justin Yigu Lin, Why Has China 's Economic Reform Been 
Successful? <http://www.franserinstitute.ca/montpelerin/papers/china_success/> (ac-
cessed Apr. 4, 2001) (discussing China's economic reform). 
46. See Luke Aloysius McGrath, Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, 
Centralization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 Fordham Inti. L.J. 2095, 
2095-96 (1995). 
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nation by law."47 The Constitution was revised in 1992 to reflect the 
state's new priority-to "promote a multi-component commodity 
economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the 
management of the State and following a socialist orientation."48 
A market economy, in other words, is now permitted, as long as it 
does not unduly disrupt the government's preferences of a "socialist 
orientation." A private sector economy, under the 1992 Constitution, 
would be permitted, as long as it remains "under the management of 
the State" and does not threaten state ownership and the one-party 
apparatus. According to the 1992 Constitution, the Party remains the 
"force leading the State and society" and "the vanguard of the 
Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and 
interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, 
acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's 
thought .... "49 Indeed, in a prompt statement issued in response to 
President Clinton's speech in Vietnam in November 2000 advocating a 
"more open, sophisticated free market, based on international rules of 
law,"50 Mr. Le Kha Phieu, the Party's General Secretary, warned: 
"Our economy has many sectors, in which the state sector plays the 
leading role. We have a private economy but we do not privatize the 
economy."51 
Like Deng Xiao Ping's slogan exclaiming that "[t]o get rich is 
glorious" in China, "capital, capital, and more capital," the Vietnamese 
government hoped, would come from the private sector, which 
includes the domestic private sector and the heavily promoted foreign-
invested sector. Reflecting the policy of encouraging a private sector, 
the Law on Companies, for example, allows Vietnamese individuals to 
form private limited liability and shareholding companies. 52 The Law 
on Private Enterprises permits Vietnamese individuals to establish their 
47. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 99 (citation omitted). 
48. Vern Weitzel, Const. of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 15 
<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/van _ kien/constit.html> (accessed Apr. 12, 200 I). 
49. Jd. at art. 4. 
50. Seth Mydans, Clinton Basks in the Adulation of a City Once Called Saigon, 
N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 20, 2000) (quoting President Clinton). 
51. Jd. (quoting Le Kha Phieu). 
52. See Pham Van Thuyet, Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in 
Transitional Economies: The Case of Viet-nam, 27 L. & Policy Inti. Bus. 541, 563-67 
(Spring 1996). 
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own private enterprises, 53 defined as "a business unit which has a level 
of capital no less than that of its legal capital, which is owned b~ an 
individual who shall ... be responsible for its business activities." 4 
Similarly, reflecting the policy of promoting a foreign-invested 
sector, the government has passed a litany of laws to support both 
foreign investment and commercial transactions. The Law on Foreign 
Investment (LFI), passed in 1987,55 was touted as "one of the most 
liberal foreign investment codes of any developing nation in the world, 
let alone Southeast Asia."56 The 1987 LFI, for example, provides for a 
duration period of twenty years for foreign-invested enterprises, which 
may be extended. 57 The LFI also assures investors that the invested 
capital and assets of foreign enterprises and private persons shall not be 
expropriated by administrative procedure, and that the enterprises shall 
not be nationalized. 58 It also allows foreign investors to set up wholly 
owned foreign enterprises, 59 rather than requiring foreign investors to 
do business through the joint venture form, whereby foreign investors 
may be relegated by law to minority equity ownership. Investors are 
also allowed to repatriate capital and profits freely. 60 
Effective July 1, 2000, the National Assembly amended the LFI 
to further liberalize the country's foreign investment regime.61 "The 
53. See Batin, Ltd., Law on Private Enterprises in Vietnam ch. l, art. l (amended 
June 22, 1994) <http://www.batin.com.vn/vninfo/docs/t339.htm> (accessed Apr. 13, 
2001). 
54. ld. at ch. l, art. 2. 
55. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra n. 36. 
56. Thomas R. Stauch, Student Author, The United States and Vietnam: 
Overcoming the Past and Investing in the Future, 28 Inti. Law. 995, I 0 ll ( 1994). 
57. Law on Foreign Investment, supra n. 36, at ch. II, art. 15. 
58. Id. at ch. III, art. 21 (amended Dec. 23, 1992). The 1992 amendment to the Law 
on Foreign Investment emphasizes Vietnam's commitment to adequate compensation 
in case of expropriation. /d. Art. 23 of Vietnam's Constitution retains for the 
government the right to expropriate property upon payment of appropriate 
compensation in a freely convertible currency. Weitzel, supra n. 48, at art. 23. 
59. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 36, at ch. II, art. 4(3) (forms of 
investment allowed consist of"[e]nterprise with one hundred (100) [percent] foreign 
owned capital.") /d. 
60. Jd. at ch. III, art. 22. The fact that the local currency, the dong, is not 
convertible makes repatriation a problem, but that has to do with convertibility, not 
with restrictions imposed by the Law on Foreign Investment. 
61. Natl. Assembly Vietnam L. No. 18/2000/QHIO, 10-7 Legis. (June 9, 2000) 
(available at <http://ivietnam.com/Eng!BUSINESSILA WS/Investment/investmentlaw/ 
lawl8.asp> (accessed Apr. 13, 2001)) (amendments & additions to Law on Foreign 
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unanimous voting principle in joint venture enterprises," previously 
required for certain joint venture actions, "was removed [with] respect 
[to] the appointment and dismissal of the Chief Accountant [and] 
approval of ... [certain] loan arrangements."62 The amended LFI 
contains other provisions generally favored by foreign investors, 
including: ( 1) a new article allowing a foreign-invested enterprise to 
purchase foreign currency from banks to meet its current transactional 
needs;63 (2) a provision reducing profits remittance tax rates to a low of 
three percent, five percent, and seven percent from the ~revious five 
percent, seven percent, and ten percent respectively; 4 and (3) a 
provision allowing investors to mortfage land use rights as security for 
loans from local and foreign banks. 6 
By all indications, Vietnam is assuredly on the path toward 
integrating with the global economy and reducing barriers to trade. It 
has announced its intention to join the World Trade Organization and 
"plans to sweeten its bid ... by offeri~ initial market access in goods 
during the next round of entry talks."6 According to estimates by the 
United Nations, Vietnam has attracted almost $11 billion in foreign 
direct investment in the last five years.67 The government has signed 
bilateral trade agreements with fifty-seven countries and territories, and 
has reached agreement on exchanging most favored nation status with 
seventy-two countries and territories.68 The U.S.-Vietnam bilateral 
Investment in Vietnam). 
62. Landmark Year for Vietnam, Asia Today (Oct. 2000) (available in Lexis, News 
library). In order to attract the maximum amount of foreign capital, Vietnam's law 
does not impose a ceiling on foreign equity ownership in joint ventures, which means 
that the majority equity partner, foreign or domestic, would be granted greater control 
via board representation. In order to ensure that the minority equity partner would not 
lose control, the LFI imposes a unanimous voting principle on certain actions, so that 
the minority's affirmative vote is necessary because the joint venture can take certain 
actions. The unanimity rule, combined with the absence of a foreign equity ceiling, 
generally mean that foreign capital can be attracted without the fear oflosing control to 
foreign investors. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 14 § 1, 
art. 21. 
63. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art 33 
64. Compare Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 36, at art. 43 with 
Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 43. 
65. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, supra n. 61, at art. 46(3). 
66. John Zarocostas, Vietnam Pushing to Advance Its WTO Entry Bid, U. Press Inti. 
(Oct. 13, 2000) (available in Lexis, News library). 
67. !d. 
68. !d. 
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accord69 gives Vietnam Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status. It is 
comprehensive, with six chapters covering goods, including 
agricultural goods, intellectual <Property, services, investment, business 
facilitation, and transparency.7 The trade accord will expand the type 
of products that Vietnam could export to the United States at the low 
NTR tariffrate.71 The World Bank estimates that Vietnam's exports in 
the first year of NTR could double the 1999 levels and rise to $1.3 
billion.72 
In return for access to the U.S. market, Vietnam must open up its 
market to U.S. products and services.73 For example, Vietnam must 
reduce, by a third to a half, tariffs across a wide range of high-tech, 
agricultural, and industrial goods. 74 It will also eliminate non-tariff 
barriers such as quotas, discretionary import licensing, and guarantee 
trading rights for Americans and Vietnamese over a phased-in period. 75 
Vietnam will adopt WTO standards for protection of intellectual 
property within one year for patents and trademarks and within 
eighteen months for copyrights and trade secrets.76 Services will also 
be liberalized, providing an opportunity for American firms to compete 
in the growing telecommunications sector,77 Internet services,78 
banking, insurance, financial services, and professional services such 
as legal, architectural and engineering. 79 In the investment field, 
69. See Agreement, supra n. 40. 
70. !d. at chs. I-VI. 
71. !d. at ch. I. 
72. See generally Brown, supra n. 30. 
73. See Agreement, supra n. 40 at ch. I, III. 
74. !d. at ch. I, annex E. 
75. ld. at ch. I, art. 3. 
76. ld. at ch. II, art 18. 
77. !d. at ch. II, annex F. The Vietnamese government is ambivalent about whether 
to open up the telecommunications industry, a necessary step if the country is to be 
technologically connected to the rest of the world, yet also a risky undertaking given 
the government's determination to retain monopoly power. According to the 
representative in Vietnam for Nokia of Finland, the mobile phone manufacturer, only 
seven tenths of one percent of Vietnamese have cell phones, and 72 percent ofthese are 
in Saigon. See Mydans, supra n. 50. 
78. See Mydans, supra n. 50. According to Gene Sperling, the White House 
economic policy adviser in the Clinton Administration, commenting on Internet use in 
Vietnam, "one-tenth of [one] percent are on the Internet; by 2005, the projection is still 
that there will be less than [one] percent." !d. An hour on the Internet costs the user 
three dollars, in a country where the per capita income is six dollars a week. ld. 
79. See Agreement, supra n. 40, at ch. III, annex F. 
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Vietnam's commitments include the elimination of local content and 
export performance requirements. 80 Under the trade agreement, 
Vietnam is also required to commit to a process of transparency81 by 
reforming its administrative policies. As discussed in Part IV, this 
commitment is perhaps the single most important step toward a legal 
reform process necessary to effectuate its economic doi moi policy. 
The promotion of a private and foreign-investment sector is also 
accompanied by efforts to reform the state sector by a process the 
government calls "equitization,"82 in a deliberate attempt to avoid the 
more ideologically provocative term "privatization." Since 1993, 
Vietnam has allowed state-owned enterprises to be transformed into 
shareho1ding companies.83 Up until 1998, about thirty companies had 
in fact sold their shares, mainly to employees.84 In 1999, Vietnam 
granted three companies permission to sell up to thirty percent of their 
shares to foreign investors, thereby allowing those investors to 
participate directly in the equitization process, and as many hope, 
raising share quality and improving transparency. 85 In July 2000, a 
securities exchange was established, with four privatized state-owned 
companies licensed to list on the exchange.86 However, like China's 
80. !d. at ch. IV. 
81. !d. at ch. IV, art. 5. 
82. Pham Nguyen Xuan Bac, Equitisation Buzzword Fails to Grab Headlines, 
Vietnam Inv. Rev. (June 12, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9575744). Note that state 
sector equitization fits into Vietnam's policy of encouraging foreign investment, in this 
case, investment in Vietnamese stocks. !d. 
83. See Frederik Balfour, Vietnam Approves Three Companies to Sell Shares to 
Foreigners, Agence France-Presse Inti. News (Jan. 14, 1999) (available in Lexis, News 
library); Vietnam Earmarks 390 Firms for Privatization this Year, Agence France-
Presse Fin. Pages (May 8, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 2788986); Bac, supra n. 82 
(explaining that although only five state enterprises were equitized by 1996, 370 had 
been equitized by the end of 1999). 
84. Balfour, supra n. 83; Minh Quang, Stock Trading Only Be Boosted By More 
Share Issues: Business, Saigon Times Daily (Sept. 18, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 
24467798). "Equitized companies have asserted the need to issue new shares to boost 
the stock market and avoid negative sentimental impact, instead of relying on already 
issued shares, which are mostly held by company employees and the State." !d. The 
large numbers of shares currently held by company employees and the government has 
also created a liquidity problem. !d. 
85. Balfour, supra n. 83; see Vietnam Exchange Tied Up in Red Tape: Investors 
Stay Home, Natl. Post DOl (July 20, 2000) (available in Lexis, News library) 
[hereinafter Red Tape]. 
86. See Red Tape, supra n. 85; Establishing St. Stock Comm., Nov. 28, 1996, 
Decree No. 75-CP, art. 1 Vietnam Off. Gaz. (Jan. 31, 1997); Michael Mathes, Are 
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"privatization" of the state sector,87 Vietnam's state sector reform is 
designed primarily to coax domestic capital accumulated in the private 
sector into state enterprises where the government acts as controlling 
shareholder. This strategy allows the government to accomplish two 
goals. First, it can bring private capital under government control, 
hence diffusing a possible threat to its power. Second, it can use 
private capital to raise funds for the ailing state sector.88 Indeed, 
private sector growth has allowed the local population to accumulate 
savings estimated at $10 billion or more in gold or hard currency, 
hidden and not deposited in banks because of a general distrust of 
formal banking channels. 89 Consequently, the government views the 
institution of shareholding and a securities market as a means throu~h 
which the state can channel private capital into its state enterprises. 0 
Indeed, the government views economic reform, even state sector 
equitization, as a vehicle to further socialism, or as Deputy Premier 
Phan Van Khai put it, "the most important guarantee for socialist 
orientation. "91 
Equitization of the state sector in Vietnam, then, is being 
conducted for the ideological purpose of furthering "market socialism." 
This has led the government to adopt a number of problematic policies. 
First, the state is less concerned that the stock market serves as a 
vehicle for the most economically promising company to raise capital, 
Investors Giddy About Vietnam Again?, Deutsche Presse-Agentur Fin. Pages (July 21, 
2000) (available in Lexis, News library); Profits Hard to Come by For Vietnam Stock 
Brokers, Deutsche Presse-Agentur Fin. Pages (Oct. 31, 2000) (available in Lexis, News 
library). 
87. See generally Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Chinese 
PriVatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 L. & Contemporary Problems 13 (2000) 
(discussing China's privitazation policy). 
88. See Fuminori Murata, Little Stock in Exchange in Vietnam: Observers Doubt 
Market Will Open Before End of Century, Nikkei Wkly. 17 (Feb. 10, 1997) (discussing 
the government's objective of enc~uraging the local population to invest because 
growth in the private sector has allowed many to hoard savings). 
89. /d. 
90. See Nick J. Freeman, On Course for a Bourse, Bus. Times (Singapore) 13 (Aug. 
29, 1998) (available in 1998 WL 27111339). 
91. Cindy Nguyen, The Vietnamese Stock Market: Viability in Southeast Asia and 
Appeal Around the World, 21 Loy. L.A. Inti. & Comp. L.J. 607, 610 (Aug. 1999) 
(quoting Phan Van Khai); Bus. Vietnam Staff, Hanoi Refuses to Let Go, Bus. Vietnam 
(June I, 1996) (available in 1996 WL 11680301) ("While the 8th Congress is unlikely 
to return Vietnam to a command economy, it will reassert the importance of the state 
sector .... "). 
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but is rather more concerned that it serves the purpose of raising capital 
for state enterprises. Thus, shares traded on the securities exchange are 
expected to be those from state-owned enterprises,92 not private firms, 
even though private companies, which are the country's engine of 
growth, are in great need of capital. The government is also the chief 
beneficiary of the securities market-on the first day of the exchange's 
opening, the povernment offered $22 million dollars of its own bonds 
for trading.9 Second, Vietnam, like China until the beginning of 
2000,94 has a quota system in which the government, not the market, 
establishes quotas for the relevant ministries and provincial authorities, 
who then decide how many state enterprises in their jurisdiction are 
allowed to equitize.95 Third, and finally, the large number of shares 
held by company employees and retained by the state due to 
ideological considerations has resulted in illiquidity in the market. 9? 
For example, trading in one of the listed companies, Transimex, had to 
be suspended because insufficient shares had been made available.97 
The company's employees had apparently agreed not to sell shares to 
outsiders. As a result, according to an official with the state-owned 
Enterprise Reform Board, "[b ]uy orders were plentiful while holders of 
shares were not ready to yield up any of theirs, most of them company 
employees."98 
The government's current equitization efforts, like its other 
policies aimed at international economic liberalization, are marred by 
the state's pursuit of "market socialism," as market-based allocation 
and individual preferences are permitted, but only to the extent that 
they do not threaten socialism's foundation. Indeed, while the United 
States insists that it is through an expansion of commercial ties that 
even hard-line Communist governments can be pulled into alignment 
with the West, Vietnam insists on the reverse-that market reforms 
92. See Profits Hard to Come by for Vietnam Stock Brokers, supra n. 86. 
93. See Red Tape, supra n. 85. 
94. See Cao, supra n. 87. 
95. See Viet D. Dinh, Financial Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam, 28 
L. & Policy Inti. Bus. 857, 885 (Spring 1997); Stock Market Struggles to Take Off, 
Bus. Vietnam (Oct. 1, 1996) (available in 1996 WL 11680367). 
96. See Quang, supra n. 84. 
97. ld. 
98. !d. (quoting Nguyen Thieng Due). In one company, the state held a thirty 
percent stake, while the employees held a fifty-five percent stake. In another, the ratio 
was forty-five percent to twenty percent, respectively. !d. 
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could only be palatable if they do not damage socialism. Vietnam's 
top Party leader, Le Kha Phieu, warned that the battle with the West 
has moved from the battlefield to other arenas. According to Mr. 
Phieu, "They continue to seek ways to completely wipe out the 
remaining socialist countries and attack the movements for 
independence, democracy and social progress. We should never relax 
our vigilance for a minute."99 
IV. RULE OF LAW AND RULE BY LAW 
A. VIETNAM'S LEGISLATION FACTORY 
Doi moi was supposed to unleash a burst of energy from within, 
as capital poured in from foreign investors. After the United States 
lifted the embargo, more than 400 U.S. firms joined European and 
Asian companies already doing business in Vietnam. 100 "By 1996 
. foreign direct investment ... reached [$]8.3 billion" and accounted 
"for more than a third of Vietnam's GDP."101 Over the past three 
years, however, foreign firms have retreated, with foreign direct 
investment falling below the 1992 level. 102 Many factors have been 
cited to explain the apparent failure of the country to fulfill early 
. expectations that it would be the next "Asian Tiger": Asia's financial 
crisis of 1997; a non-convertible currency; a rudimentary financial 
system; a see-saw attitude exhibited by some factions of the Party 
toward foreign investment; and the Party's waging of a "social evils" 
campaign in 1996. 
But one of the keys, if not the key, to the problem that Vietnam 
faces as it engages in the process of reform is its legal system. Then 
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, speaking at the 1993 National Juridical 
Conference in Hanoi, acknowledged the country's need to pursue legal 
renovation as well as economic renovation. "We lack many laws. In 
the economic field, which is a priority in legislation, a legal framework 
still has to be worked out."103 Yet, as discussed above, Vietnam has in 
99. See Sanger, supra n. 44 (quoting Le Kha Phieu). 
100. F.T. McCarthy, Goodnight Vietnam: Foreign Direct Investment: Vietnam Was 
Meant to Be the Next Asian Phenomenon, But this Tiger Never Roared, Economist 
(Jan. 8, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 8140317) [hereinafter Goodnight Vietnam]. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. 
103. Rose, supra n. 12, at 105. 
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fact filled the void by passing many laws. It is also true that there has 
been a "quiet resurgence of legal discourse"104 in Vietnam, with law 
faculties reopening and institutions of legal education established. 105 It 
is also true that the Seventh Communist Party Congress expanded doi 
moi's economic policy initiated by the Sixth Communist Party 
Congress to include legal reform. The Central Committee of the Party 
called on the National Legislature to "improve the skills of lawmakers 
in promulgating and organizing the implementation of law."106 
According to Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, "there must be a complete 
chan~e from bureaucratic management to running the nation by 
law." 07 The Constitution, accordingly, states that "[a]ll Party 
organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution and the 
Law."l08 
Yet the "rule of law"-the institution of law that subjects the 
government as well as the people to its rule in a transparent, impartial, 
and predictable manner-is far from a reality in the country. "[L]egal 
education in Vietnam remains tethered to abstract socialist political 
principles, under which law is considered to be a purely political tool to 
shape the people and to build a new society."109 
The Vietnamese government has passed "hundreds of new laws 
and ordinances-running up to 20,000 pages in the last decade .... "110 
Indeed, "[t]he government has become a virtual legislation factory with 
new laws, decrees, circulars, directives and regulations, often in draft 
104. Mark Side!, The Re-Emergence of Legal Discourse in Vietnam, 43 Inti. & 
Comp. L.Q. 163, 163 (1994). 
105. /d. at 165; See Rose, supra n. 12, at 101 n. 21. Similarly, law school enrollment 
has increased, with courses ranging from traditional legal subjects such as 
constitutional law, administrative law, civil and criminal procedures, "Law and State," 
and courses on Marxism/Leninism. ld. 
106. Rose, supra n. 12, at 99. 
107. Jd. 
108. Weitzel, supra n. 48 at ch. 1, art. 4. 
109. Rose, supra n. 12, at 101. 
110. /d. at 100. A slew of laws have been adopted, such as: "a Criminal Code 
(1986), a Criminal Procedure Code (1989), a Law of Trade Unions (1989), a Press Law 
(1989), Taxes on Natural Resources, High Income and Housing (199'0), Law on 
Religion (1991), Laws of National Assembly Organization and Elections (1992), 
Foreign Investment Law (1987), Bankruptcy Law (1994), and an Environmental 
Protection Law (1994)." Jd. at 101, n. 19. In an attempt to shift from rule by the Party 
to ostensibly the "rule of law," the government enacted an 834-article Civil Code in 
1995 that covers comprehensively the various aspects of Vietnamese life. Jd. at 101. 
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form, coming out almost weekly."111 While the shift from a system 
based on rule by Party decree to one based on the "rule of law" is 
significant, legal reform requires more than passing laws. The deluge 
of new laws has resulted in increased bureaucratization whereby 
overlapping ministries and agencies issue contradictory laws, 
ordinances, decrees, and circulars, leading to inconsistent application 
of the law and the fostering of "an uncertain climate."112 In addition, 
local People's Councils often issue decrees that vary from national 
laws. 113 It has thus been widely reported that "[l]aws and regulations 
are often poorly drafted and ambiguous, and are apt to be construed 
differently by various government bodies."114 The more official 
published laws are surrounded· by a morass of decrees, unpublished 
"drawer regulations," and freewheeling local regulations, the greater 
the chances are for "flexibility" and corruption. As noted, 
"[ c ]orruption is a way of life in Vietnam, and requests for payments are 
often made bl various . . . officials . . . at different levels of 
government."11 Furthermore, the absence of a mechanism to provide 
the public with legal information has only added to the confusion. To 
ensure adequate dissemination of information among governmental 
agencies, official laws are supposed to be published in the Office of the 
111. Jonathan L. Golin, Tiger by the Tail, 81 ABA J. 62, 64 (Feb. 1995). 
112. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 102. 
[T]he local administrative agency is subject to the "horizontal" subordination 
of the People's Committee at the same level and the "vertical" subordination 
to the relevant ministry (or the agency of ministerial rank) in professional 
matters. Local administration seems to be a decentralized system but the 
principle of double subordination reintroduces a certain kind of 
centralization . . . . However, this does not mean that the Government has 
hierarchical power over the organs on a lower level. The power of the 
Government over the lower levels is "indirect." 
!d. (citation omitted). 
113. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 102-03; McGrath, supra n. 46, at 2121-22 (for a 
discussion of the tension between the local or provincial level and the national 
government). 
114. Mathilde L. Genovese, What Every Investor Needs to Know About Doing 
Business in Vietnam Practical Guidelines and Tips, 18 E. Asian Exec. Reps. 9, 24 
(Aug. 15, 1996). 
115. !d. 
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Government Gazette; yet, its circulation of 3,000 copies is far below 
the 20,000 to 30,000 required. 116 
Ever-changing rules and unpublished and non-uniform rules have 
not created a system based on the "rule oflaw." Rather, the reverse has 
occurred, impeding the development of a comprehensive and consistent 
framework of law and leaving investors more vulnerable to abuse and 
corruption by local officials. As aptly put by The Economist: 
Every investor has a different horror story. The paper that 3M 
imports to make Post-It Notes faces an arbitrarily high tariff as 
"office products" (40% duty) rather than "adhesive-backed paper" 
(10%). This makes it more expensive than the same Post-It Notes 
smugglers bring in from Thailand .... A Taiwanese investor was 
so frustrated by corrupt customs officials who failed to do what 
they had been bribed to do that it tried to sue one of them for 
breach of contract. 117 
B. THE RULE OF LAW FOR A MARKET ECONOMY 
Referring to Vietnam's eclectic legal traditions, a commentator 
has noted that Vietnam's legal system "is a hodgepodge of remnants of 
the French civil law system, pre-doi moi socialist decrees, and the 
recent proliferation of commercially oriented regulations lifted 
wholesale from market economies."118 Certainly legal reform has been 
made more complicated by this confusion. 
As has been discussed elsewhere, 119 Vietnam has historically 
been influenced by Chinese traditions with an emphasis on a "rule of 
moral" rather than the "rule of law."120 "There is a tendency in 
Vietnam, as in China historically, to rely on 'morality, custom, kinship 
or politics, rather than formal legality. "'121 Village tradition, rituals, 
116. Rose, supra n. 12, at 103 n. 28. 
117. See Goodnight Vietnam, supra n. 100. 
118. Golin, supra n. Ill, at 63. 
119. Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 325-26; Gillespie, supra n. 22, at 555. 
120. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 96. This is not to say that rule of moral systems had 
no law generally or no contract law specifically. Recent works on China, for example, 
show that the Chinese had some system of contract law even in the earlier periods. 
Jonathan D. Spence, The Death of Woman Wang 71-72 (Viking Press 1978); Hugh T. 
Scogin, Jr., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Dynasty China, 
63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1325, 1376 (1990). 
121. See Rose, supra n. 12, at 96 (citation omitted). 
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and familial status constituted a form of"unofficiallaw" coexisting and 
sometimes challenging the "official law" of the imperial 
bureaucracy. 122 Imperial law was vertical law between the sovereign 
and the individual and did not concern matters that involved horizontal 
rights between one individual and another. 123 As a result, "private 
commercial relationships remained creatures of customary practice .... 
Trade was apparently organized along a network of interlocking 
obligations. Relationships depended upon the observance of patronage 
obligations, such as son to father, family to clan, and clan to 
village."124 Community trust formed the basis of trade among clan or 
village members, and the guidance and mediation of "men of virtuous 
character" were relied upon to resolve disputes. 125 Local institutions 
were "states within a state"-hence, the apt proverb, "the laws of the 
emperor give way to the customs of the village." 126 
Imported into this system was a French colonial civil law system 
of rights-based law that governed French citizens and other 
Europeans. 127 A small number of Vietnamese bureaucrats, judicial 
officers, law~ers, and merchants also were exposed to and learned 
French law. 1 8 In the North, following independence from the French, 
a centralized leffl system reflecting a Soviet-style planned economy 
was instituted. 9 Land was brought under state or collective 
ownership by the Vietnamese Workers Party, which succeeded in 
disrupting the traditional "tradin~ culture that had survived both 
Chinese and French annexation."1 0 Given the Marxist view that the 
"rule of law" is a form of legal fetishism, it is not surprising that the 
Party's hostility to legalism was extended to the South at the end of the 
war. 131 Since the implementation of doi moi, the government has 
embarked on the process of legal reform. 
These efforts, however, as suggested above, have merely resulted 
in legislation overload and confusion. It would appear that, with its 
122. See Gillespie, supra n. 22, at 559. 
123. See Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 327-28. 
124. !d. 
125. !d. at 328-29. 
126. See Gillespie, supra n. 22, at 560. 
127. See Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 329. 
128. !d. 
129. !d. 
130. !d. at 331. 
131. !d. at 332-33. 
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nee-Confucian system and a Soviet legacy of immense distrust of law, 
Vietnam's legal system does not have the type of rules that meet 
international standards necessary to support a modem market economy. 
In other words, it does not have what law and development advisers 
generally term the "rule oflaw."132 
The "rule of law," as many commentators have observed, should 
achieve the following purposes: to protect against Hobbesian anarchy; 
to "allow people to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that 
they can know in advance the legal consequences of various actions"; 
and to guarantee against official arbitrariness. 133 Vietnam's legal 
reform, even in the limited area of market institutions and commercial 
relationships, has failed to live up to those standards. 
For a country that is establishing a market economy aimed at 
global integration, Vietnam's laws are still more suitable for a society 
organized along traditional, pre-modem lines. As sociologists have 
noted, there has been a historical evolution from "community" to 
"society."134 The former is characterized by groups bound by kinship, 
ethnic, or religious ties, or ties based on other affinities. The latter is 
characterized by persons who interact more on an arm's length basis 
than on a relational basis, so that their ties are looser than those forged 
in a community context. The transformation from community to 
spciety has generally accompanied the evolution from feudalism to 
132. See Fallon, supra n. 9, at 6-7. Fallon has identified four "ideal-typical 
conceptions" of the "rule of law"-historicist, formalist, Legal Process and 
substantive-to come up with his thesis that the "rule of law" is "best conceived as 
comprising multiple strands, including values and considerations to which each of the 
four competing ideal types calls attention." /d. at 5-6. 
133. See id. at 7-8. Against the context of these background purposes are the five 
elements of the "rule of law" that Richard Fallon identified: (I) legal rules must be 
comprehensible so that people can understand the law and comply with it; (2) the law 
should be able to guide people in the conduct of their affairs; (3) it should be stable; (4) 
it should constitute a supreme source of authority whose scope should include officials 
as well as ordinary citizens; (5) it should be impartial and courts should be available to 
enforce it. /d. at 8-9. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-39 (Yale U. Press 
1964) (specifying eight criteria for law to exist: generality, publicity, prospectivity, 
clarity, noncontradictoriness, capability of being followed, stability, and congruence 
between norms as stated and as applied). 
134. See generally Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (Basic Books, Inc. 
1966); Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 
(Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans., Mich. St. U. Press 1957). 
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modernism, from exchanges based on relations and "natural will" to 
exchanges based on contract and "rational wi11."135 
"The reciprocal ties of social obligation among members of a 
community defined standards of behavior"136 when community was 
central in members' lives. The shift away from the primacy of 
"community" toward "society" has meant a shift from exchanges based 
on community ties to exchanges based on freedom of contract-
"a world of independent actors, each of whom should be allowed to 
pursue his or her own interests without regard for the interests of 
others," absent fraud and public policy considerations. 137 
Again, a word of caution is in order. The status/contract, 
community/society distinctions should not be overstated to characterize 
traditional communities as inert and frozen in time, their inhabitants 
trapped by status, while Western societies are viewed as progressive 
and active, with inhabitants freely defining themselves through contract 
rather than inherited status. There are aspects of both status and 
contract in different legal systems, and as some sociologists have 
remarked on the overly blunt categorization of status versus contract, 
collective versus individual distinction, "collectivity and individuality 
in legal matters are aspects of all systems, not alternative systems .... 
The generalizations couched in these terms use one aspect of a system 
to characterize the whole, which is a procedure of dubious worth."138 
That said, in today's international economic system, commercial 
laws, such as modem contract law, are necessary to facilitate open 
market transactions. Such laws allow for the enforcement of individual 
exchanges, taking into consideration the parties' expectations and 
allowing for the imposition of damages in case of breach. The 
enforcement of such exchanges is essential to develop an open market 
economy (as opposed to an economy based on close familistic or 
community ties where enforcement depends on trust and ostracism) 
and is premised on the assumption that an open market furthers 
135. See generally Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law 99-100 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 
1917); Tonnies, supra n. 134; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society 
(W.D. Halls trans., Macmillan 1984). 
136. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 
831 (1983). 
137. See id. at 839. 
138. Sally F. Moore, Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation: Some Aspects 
of Strict Liability, Self-help and Collective Responsibility, in The Allocation of 
Responsibility 51, 100-01 (Max Gluckman ed., Manchester U. Press 1972). 
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individual freedom of action and constitutes the most efficient means 
of allocating resources and maximizing wealth for individuals and 
society. 139 
· Simply put, absent public policy and fraud considerations, market 
economies generally do not question individual preferences, allowing 
allocations by the market rather than substituting them with 
government preferences or commands from the central plan. The legal 
system facilitates private choices made in the market-thus it is crucial 
in developing a market economy. Where voluntary exchanges are 
made on an arm's length basis between strangers, as they generally are 
in a modem market economy, they must be made with the general 
understanding that contracts will be enforceable and binding on the 
parties absent some overriding public policy consideration. If Vietnam 
is to transform its economy from one that is defined by community 
norms of the village and the clan to an economy that is defined by non-
relational, arm's length norms, then the development of a "rule of law" 
to enforce arms' length exchanges is all the more urgent. 
Without asserting a causal link between economic growth and a 
market-based economy (although there is increasing evidence that there 
is some link between the two), I note merely that Vietnam has made the 
decision to embark on doi moi based on its own assessment that a 
market is necessary to increase efficiency, maximize wealth, and 
promote economic growth-this despite the fear that attracting global 
capital to the domestic market might very well lead to the inevitable 
dfminution of the Party's own power. Yet, the exercise of individual 
choices in a market economy is only meaningful if such exercise is free 
from arbitrary government interference and enforceable bylaws that are 
impartial, transparent, and predictable. Take the simple example of a 
contract between a foreign company and a domestic state enterprise. If 
the rule of modem contract law were to be established, it should be 
obvious that even governmental actors would be held subject to the 
"rule of law." Could investors be certain that a Vietnamese court 
would apply the law and issue a judgment against a state enterprise or 
that a Vietnamese court would enforce a foreign arbitral award that had 
been granted in the investor's favor against a state-owned company? 
Could investors be certain that the law would not be replaced by a 
series of laws or decrees seeking to interpret and reinterpret the first 
139. See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 
8 J. Leg. Stud. 103, 132 (1979). 
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law? These are elementary and obvious questions, yet the answers are 
neither obvious nor certain in Vietnam. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Twenty years ago, Vietnam had been virulently anti-capital, anti-
market. In the immediate postwar years, it adopted two general 
policies in its economic development objectives: first, to rely not on the 
market but on the government, through a central plan, to override 
individual preferences and implement developmental objectives that 
reflect state preferences; and second, to insulate the national economy 
from the international economic system in order to break what it 
considered to be the neo-colonial, dependent relationship that has 
defined First and Third World countries. 140 The Party ruled by 
administrative decree to ensure the institution of those objectives. 141 
Twenty years later, it is noteworthy that the U.S.-Vietnam 
bilateral trade agreement-the legal document that governs trade 
between the two countries-contains a separate chapter detailing the 
precise steps Vietnam must undertake to establish the rules of law over 
matters applicable to the agreement. 142 The chapter entitled, 
"Transparency-Related Provisions and the Right to Appeal," is 
designed to ensure, through provisions dealing with public notice, that 
fundamentals such as the right to comment, the dissemination and 
publication of applicable laws, the right to a hearing, the right to 
judicial review, and the basic principles underlying a "rule of law"-
transparency, predictability, and impartiality-would be 
implemented. 143 
Article 1 requires each nation to "publish on a regular and prompt 
basis all laws, regulations and administrative procedures of general 
application pertaining to any matter covered by this Agreement" 144 so 
as to allow those interested to become acquainted with them before 
they come into effect. Article 3 requires each nation to allow "the 
other . . . and its nationals the opportunity to comment on the 
formulation of laws, regulations and administrative procedures of 
140. See generally Gillespie, supra n. 23, at 330-33. 
141. /d. 
142. See Agreement, supra n. 40, at ch. 6, arts. 1-8. 
143. !d. 
144. !d. at ch. 6, art. l. 
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general application that may affect the conduct of business 
activities .... " 145 Article 5 requires that all relevant measures be 
published in official journals on a regular basis. 146 Article 6 requires 
the respective governments to administer their laws, regulations, and 
administrative frocedures "in a uniform, impartial and reasonable 
manner .... "
14 Finally, Article 7 mandates the maintenance of 
"administrative and judicial tribunals and procedures for the 
purpose ... of the prompt review and correction ... of administrative 
action relating to matters covered by this Agreement."148 It also 
provides for the "right of appeal," and if the right to appeal is initially 
to an administrative body, "there shall also be the opportunity for 
appeal ofthe decision to a judicial body."149 
In 1995, President Clinton dispatched then Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, to Vietnam to establish the groundwork for a post~ 
embargo relationship. 150 Mr. Christopher warned that embarking on 
economic reform was similar to undertaking "a passage over a 
ravine."151 
The passage is bound to be intricate, arduous, and complicated. 
Pendulum swings between the hardliners opposed to, and reformers 
favoring, international economic integration, are bound to occur and 
recur in the coming years. But on a pragmatic level, if the government 
wishes to create an economy where its people will be making more 
than one dollar a day, it will have to work with, not against, the forces 
of global economic integration, to promote economic engagement, not 
segregation. In spite of political constraints, Saigon, for example, has 
built a robust private sector whose ten percent growth rate, according to 
its mayor, has created jobs and brought the city's poverty level 
down. 152 It might tum out, indeed, that twenty-five years after the end. 
of the war, it is the South that will be in the position to liberate the 
North. 
145. ld. at ch, 6, art. 3. 
146. /d.atch.6,art. 5. 
147. ld. at ch. 6, art. 6. 
148. Id. at ch. 6, art. 7. 
149. ld. 
150. See Sanger, supra n. 44. 
151. /d. 
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